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 Since the death of Mao and the rise of reformers in China, the world has eagerly 
awaited the results of changes sweeping through the developing nation. Deng 
Xiaoping and his successors have promised reform, which has come in the form of 
market liberalization. Now, after 20 years of reform, the Chinese people have seen a 
boom of economic prosperity. Their nation has joined the WTO and taken a central 
role in the world economy. Reform has also reduced political oversight of people’s 
daily lives and allowed the economy and society to exist in a less regulated 
environment. That being said, liberalization has also had dramatic effects on the 
delivery of social welfare, a major component of the socialist system, which is still the 
official goal of market development. To relieve enterprises of the burden of welfare 
delivery and allow the market to flourish through capitalist initiatives, the Party / state 
was obliged to reduce taxation on state owned enterprises in hopes of freeing capital 
with which the enterprises could invest. However, this both put more pressure on the 
government to deliver resources and reduced the state budget with which to do so. As 
the government’s share of national GDP dwindled, the state began accessing bank 
capital to finance welfare programs. Doing so has in turn depleted bank resources and 
left the nation in dire need of foreign capital donation. It was in this landscape that 
foreign non-government organizations (NGO’s) emerged; delivering both efficient 
and equitable changes to existing welfare delivery systems and much needed foreign 
capital. The Chinese Communist Party’s dependency on performance legitimacy 
through the social contract system directly led to escalating financial problems. NGOs, 
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in pursuing their own goals, have enhanced the delivery of welfare in China and, in 
turn, helped to maintain the legitimacy of Party / state rule. 
 
Early Reform
 “Reform” is a very loose term; malleable and transient. It is the kind of word used 
by politicians to hide behind. It replaces complex concepts and packages them in one 
neat, clean idea. It is, however, necessary to avoid simplifying the changes in China 
today with a single word. Reform in China is a myriad of changes. It is a liberalization 
of society and economy. It is a switch in the way the Party and state earn legitimacy, 
both domestically and abroad. It is an attempt to balance socialism and capitalism and 
prove to the world that capitalism can be improved upon with government oversight 
and socialist intentions. Xiaonong Cheng describes it with the following; “Reform in 
a socialist country is a process of institutional transformation which includes 
redefining the interests of, and the relationship between, State and society”.1 The 
current Chinese experiment is a groundbreaking effort to save a Communist state 
under the pressure of encroaching capitalism. The survival of the Chinese state will 
mark success where the Soviet Union and other Communist nations have failed, 
breaking under the strain encroaching capitalism. The importance of this process is 
obvious. Less obvious is its complexity. 
 
 
                                                        
1 Xiaonong Cheng. “Breaking the Social Contract.” Dilemmas of Reform in Jiang Zemin’s China. London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999. 108. 
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Legitimacy 
Max Weber claimed that the legitimacy of any government is based on one of 
three grounds.  
1. Rational Grounds: An honest belief by citizens in the legality of 
rules and the right of the government’s authority. 
2. Traditional Grounds: A citizen’s belief in the sanctity of tradition. 
3. Charismatic Grounds: A belief in the exemplary character of 
leadership.2 
All three grounds for legitimacy require something of the government to earn 
citizens’ support. For a nation to have rational legitimacy it must earn the citizens’ 
trust. By providing opportunity, security, justice and or prosperity, legitimacy can be 
earned. For a nation to have traditional legitimacy it must earn the citizens’ faith. 
Having or constructing a glorious history, promoting the religious right to rule, or 
maintaining an ancient tradition of rule will earn government legitimacy through the 
citizens’ faith in tradition. To earn charismatic legitimacy, the leadership must be of 
irreproachable character. This can occur either from the actual virtue of a leader’s 
character or from a constructed ideology which professes the leadership’s virtue. 
According to Weber only these three methods are available secure legitimacy and 
support from a populace and ensure the survival of rule. 
Before the Communist forces took control of China in 1949, emperors ruled the 
Middle Kingdom through successive dynasties. Their legitimacy derived from the 
                                                        
2 Guoguang Wu. “Legitimacy Crisis, Political Economy, and the Fifteenth Party Congress.” Dilemmas of Reform 
in Jiang Zemin’s China. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. 14. 
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thousands plus year history of dynastic rule in China. The people believed in the 
strength and power of tradition and rarely questioned the government system; only at 
times its rulers. When the PRC ‘liberated’ the nation from imperial rule, it did so in 
hopes of destroying the traditions of China. The revolution was an attack on the 
traditional system of rule and, as such, the PRC could not maintain legitimacy through 
tradition. It had, however, established an ideology, which carried the Communists 
through the civil war and on to victory. Legitimacy for the early PRC was one derived 
from the faith in Communism and the success of that ideology in direct competition 
with the bourgeois nationalists. Over the history of the PRC the ideology changed 
from a belief in Marxism-Leninism to a devout following of Mao and his thought. It 
was charisma and ideology that carried Mao through the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution, not actual success in providing more food or security. Xiaonong 
Cheng describes the system as “command and obedience.”3 Since the government 
could not satisfy people with a better life, they suppressed the masses with ideology. 
However, market liberalization following the death of Mao helped shift the 
structure of government legitimacy once more. As the nation lost its charismatic 
leader and the ideology he professed was slowly abandoned, the government needed a 
new method to secure loyalty. If Max Weber is correct in his analysis of government 
legitimacy, the PRC only had two choices. Having already smashed tradition, the 
Party / state could reconstruct a new ideology or actually provide the resources to 
promote rational legitimacy. In a sense, both methods were pursued with the later 
                                                        
3 Xiaonong Cheng. “Breaking the Social Contract.” 109. 
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being the most significant. 
In the era of Deng Xiaoping, the Party / state pursued legitimacy through the 
performance of the economy. Great strides were made in liberalizing the market; 
allowing growth and prosperity to emerge bit by bit. However, the Party was still 
uninterested in political reform, a key component to rational legitimacy. In the 
beginning, both political and economic reforms are relatively easy. As reform 
continues the process grows in complexity. By the 15th party congress and the 
emergence of Jiang Zemin as Deng’s successor, economic reform had become an 
increasingly difficult task. Reform had led to a variety of unwanted negative 
consequences that seemed to grow as reform continued. Unemployment, the income 
gap and capital flight all emerged and grew as liberalization and restructuring 
continued. Despite the risk involved in continuing economic reform, political reform 
remained untried.4 Essentially, the Party feared political reform for the potential 
disaster it could have to Party rule. Instead of pursuing the potentially easier political 
reform, the Party pushed harder on economic reform, trying to squeeze more 
legitimacy out of an already tapped process. 
Despite Jiang Zemin’s efforts to idealize the “Deng Xiaoping Theory”, it would 
be economic performance that would emerge as the pursued method of securing 
citizens support and faith in the party. The previous “command and control” system 
was replaced by “feed and cooperate.”5 Economic performance, not ideology or 
charisma, would be the Party / state’s link to survival. 
                                                        
4 Guoguang Wu. “Legitimacy Crisis, Political Economy, and the Fifteenth Party Congress.” 15. 
5 Xiaonong Cheng. “Breaking the Social Contract.” 108. 
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The Social Contract System 
 The social contract system is often thought of as a founding philosophy behind 
modern democracy. However, in its most basic sense, a social contract is a form of 
trade between a government and its people and can occur under any political system. 
As citizens put their faith and trust in a ruling government they expect in exchange 
certain benefits; security, opportunity, basic needs, etc. When the contract is 
unfulfilled, it is often thought that the people have the right to change their 
government, or at the very least withhold support. In China, the Party / state receives 
support by providing economic benefits. Legitimacy is exchanged for development in 
China’s emerging social contract. However, if reform fails and benefits become scarce, 
the citizens of China can and will withdraw their faith in Party rule. The social 
contract has become a viable means to legitimacy, replacing ideological rule, but the 
same system that today holds up the Party may tomorrow initiate its fall. 
 For the most part, the maintenance of the social contract is dependent upon the 
happiness of the urban population. Those living in cities have more access to 
education and outside information and are, as such, more politically influential. They 
are also more easily organized and work in industrial sectors crucial to the survival of 
the state. Dissent among the urban workers can be more disruptive to the functioning 
of the national economy than dissent in rural populations and as such the government 
has focused most welfare programs in cities. However, the situation among the urban 
workers is quite complicated and securing their support is difficult. In the late 80’s 
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and early 90’s close to 85% of the urban population worked in the state sector.6 Their 
lives were that of organized dependency with all essentials of life provided through 
each danwei or work unit. During early market reform, it was the goal of the urban 
population to adopt a modern lifestyle while at the same time preserve the benefits of 
state socialism. It is because of this contradiction that the Party / state stopped short of 
complete reform and the Chinese social welfare system remained throughout early 
market liberalization. 
 As reform progressed, the Party / state’s dependence on the social contract 
deepened and the delivery of welfare benefits became increasingly important. In 1990, 
Jiang Zemin reminded the local officials that “buying political stability with money” 
was a key policy to be understood.7 To maintain legitimacy and draw attention away 
from the negative impacts of reform, the early 1990’s saw a great amount of money 
funneled through the social contract. Benefits took many forms. Fiscally, the state 
provided massive amounts of welfare and material benefits to state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to raise the opportunity cost of switching to the private sector. It gave 
concessions such as offering benefits through reform or refusing to take away 
workers’ already vested interests. In the most extreme concessions, the Party / state 
would actually abandon some aspects of reform to spare the negative consequences of 
an unfulfilled social contract. When Zhu Rongji tired to reduce the number of 
redundant mining workers in 1991, angered employees rose up and killed a manager, 
                                                        
6 Ibid, 110. 
7 Ibid, 113. 
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successfully scaring Zhu away from reform in the industry.8 The people’s reaction in 
the social contract became an obvious limitation on how far reform could proceed in 
China, and the party’s dependency on the social contract system weakened its 
authority to make unpopular choices. 
 
Consequences 
 Reform during the late 20th century produced mixed results. Positively, reform 
created more opportunities for work in the non-public sector as SOEs lost significance. 
The social contract succeeded in stabilizing the economy and, in turn, the political 
legitimacy of the Party. Economic growth was secured and the increase in foreign 
trade has opened avenues for foreign investment and opportunities for export by 
domestic enterprises. However, the reform movement was only partial in scope; 
mainly due to popular resistance like the mining situation stated above. By not 
completing the reform movement, the Party has de facto protected institutional 
legacies of the past, such as inefficient SOEs. It has allowed corruption to grow and 
has exhausted resources on unproductive endeavors. 
Reform’s Impact on Social Welfare 
 It was the initial goal of reform to create a welfare system that is both just and 
efficient.9 Previously, the socialist welfare system created in the PRC was universal. 
The Iron Rice bowl aimed to ensure that all people had food and security. It was a 
unilateral project taken on by the Party / state in that those who benefited had no 
                                                        
8 Ibid, 115. 
9 Gao Shangquan, Chi Fulin, ed. China’s Social Security System. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1996. 18. 
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control of, or responsibility for, its maintenance. Workers worked and the state took 
care of their needs. However, the system could not survive through reform. It was an 
inefficient system because citizens could often abuse benefits with little of no 
consequences. Over use of medical treatment and other benefits provided through 
SOEs drained money out of the system. To rectify the problem the state reduced the 
taxation on enterprises and had employees pay a partial tax to contribute to the fund.10 
By having employees pay for their welfare indirectly, the state maintained the welfare 
system while reducing the occurrences of abuse. 
 The above is an example of welfare reform aimed at increasing efficiency. 
Efficiency however is not simply a factor of the system itself. Because it has been the 
burden of enterprises to maintain the welfare of its employees, efficiency is most 
often a product of successful business. In the past, problems have arisen, especially 
among small, limited capital firms, when medical payments or insurance benefits 
were too high to promote overall productivity. When the government reduced taxation 
on SOEs it not only made workers more responsible, it also freed capital for the SOEs 
to invest and increase productivity. Maximizing welfare efficiency is directly linked to 
maximizing the productivity of the local economy. 
 Justice in the welfare system is a goal of equal benefits regardless of an 
individual’s class in society. It is also the belief that welfare benefits should be equal 
between industries and enterprises. One of the greatest challenges to Chinese welfare 
reform is ensuring justice between rural and urban, rich and poor sectors of society. 
                                                        
10 Ibid, 8. 
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 With those two evaluations in mind it seems that the welfare system has made 
certain strides but remains imperfect. In an interview with Duan Guang of the Institute 
of Economy, he expressed that the current state of welfare is improving.11 Currently, 
welfare is delivered in three ways; through private insurance, government subsidies, 
and provisions to employees of bankrupt companies. Although much of the welfare 
system still lies in the hands of danwei, Duan Guang believes the system covers 
nearly all urban residents successfully. 
 In fact, in the year 2000 the government set up a social security fund to better 
provide for the welfare of the Chinese people. According to the Xinhua news agency, 
the fund totaled 170.8 billion Yuan (20.8 billion US$) by the end of 2004.12 Also in 
2004, the investment rate of the fund in the stock market reached 15%, as the 
government hoped to let investment mature the fund over the coming years. 
Investment into the fund is also enhanced by the Social Welfare Lottery. Much like 
lotteries in the United State, the Social Welfare Lottery provides an opportunity for 
ticket buyers to match numbers with those in a drawing. Benefits pay out well while 
proceeds go to support the welfare system.13
 Internally, there are signs that the government’s attention to welfare reform has 
borne fruit. The People’s daily reported in 2001 that 6 million laid off workers were 
receiving stipends for basic expenses and that 31 million retirees were drawing 
pensions successfully. The article also claimed that the Ministry of Labor and Social 
                                                        
11 Duan Guang. Interview with Duan Guang. Institute of Economy. 18 May 2005. 
12 China Social Security Fund Announces Total Assets. Xinhua News Agency. 29 March 2005. 
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/124092.htm> 
13 Duan Guang. Interview. 
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Security was to create employment opportunities for 8 million unemployed people in 
hopes of lowering unemployment to below 4% by years end.14
 Despite the domestic news opinion however, the system looks less successful 
from the outside. Duan Guang was willing to point out that welfare in the rural areas 
is practically non-existent, with retirement security coming from large families not 
government funds. Workers who migrate to the cities from the countryside are equally 
uninsured, notes Duan Guang, and have no welfare benefits at all. This suggests a 
major flaw in the justice of the current social welfare system. Perhaps because urban 
workers have more political influence, the government has used the social contract to 
provide welfare in the cities but not in the countryside.  
There is also an increasing gap between income in urban areas and income in the 
countryside. In 2002, the nominal ratio of income in the cities to income in the 
countryside was 3.11 to 1. When the differences between consumer price indices in 
the respective local economies are considered the real ratio of 2.30 is rendered. In 
other words, prices assumed the same, the income in urban areas is 2.3 times higher 
than income in rural areas.15 The inequity of the system has started to effect efficiency 
as well. When rural areas have less income, the demand from them for domestically 
produce goods dwindles. Demand for domestic products has also gone down in cities, 
but for a different reason. As urbanites’ income increases so to does their taste for 
imported goods. Combined, the rural / urban income gap has left Chinese enterprises 
                                                        
14 Social Security Work Improves in China. People’s Daily. 31 Dec 2001. 
<http://english.people.com.cn/200112/12/eng20011212_86531.shtml> 
15 Cai Fang. “Rural Urban Income Gap and Critical Point of Institutional Change.” 21 May 2005. 
<http://www.cass.net.cn/chinese/s06_rks/37wp.pdf> 
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with decreasing domestic demand for Chinese-made goods.16
 Another gap is also forming within Chinese society; the gap between rich and 
poor. According to the State Statistics Bureau as reported by the People’s Daily, “less 
than five percent of China's wealthiest hold nearly a half of the country's savings 
deposits worth more than 6 trillion Yuan.”17 An increasing problem represented by 
this income disparity is capital flight. The wealthy five percent mentioned above have 
enough money to invest substantial amounts abroad; reducing China’s domestic 
capital flows. Also, unemployment from SOE layoffs continues to be a problem and 
its consequences are evident in the rift between rich and poor. Throughout the reform 
period, the inefficiency of SOEs has been a menacing problem. In a 1997 article by 
Guoguang Wu entitled “Legitimacy Crisis, Political Economy, and the Fifteenth Party 
Congress,” it is estimated that 70% of China’s 100,000 SOEs are losing money.18 Part 
of the problem is over-employment and, to avoid losses, the government has been 
forced to perform layoffs, which put legitimacy at risk. Guoguang Wu reports that 
30% of the 113 million industrial workers are not needed. In all sectors, 100 million 
jobs may be sacrificed in the pursuit of efficiency. The results have been worse than 
the People’s daily 2001 prediction. The Economist, a British publication that monitors 
international politics and economics, cited that in 2003 Chinese unemployment 
reached 10.1% after steadily rising from 8.2% in 2000.19 Duan Guang also mentioned 
that the growing population would continue to put strain on the economy, raising 
                                                        
16 Xiaonong Cheng. “Breaking the Social Contract.” 119. 
17 China’s Income Disparity Grows. People’s Daily. 12 July 2000. 
<http://english.people.com.cn/english/200007/12/eng20000712_45330.html> 
18 Guoguang Wu. “Legitimacy Crisis, Political Economy, and the Fifteenth Party Congress.” 20. 
19 Country Briefings: China. The Economist. 13 May 2004.   
http://www.economist.com/countries/China/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20Data> 
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unemployment rates even more. 
 In all, reform of the social welfare system has progressed but is unable to get past 
one of China’s most pervasive economic problems, a lack of money. SOEs do not 
have enough money to support large payrolls and the government, despite the welfare 
fund, does not have enough money to support a truly just and efficient welfare system. 
The financial market of China is under constant strain and its woes send shockwaves 
though the welfare system. 
Where has all the money gone? 
 As stated above, a popular method for improving responsibility in the social 
welfare system was to split taxation between enterprises and workers. This also freed 
capital for enterprise investment. However, the money that is collected from workers 
fails to fully compensate for the amount of money freed in enterprises. Viewing this 
system as a closed economy, the money freed for investment must be accounted for. 
In actuality, the state’s annual budget has been shrinking as a result.  Xiaonong 
Cheng cites that in 1978 the state consumption of GDP was at 35% and dropped to 
20% by 1988.20 Since 1988, the state’s budget has been unable to finance the social 
contract. According to the Economist, the state’s consumption of the national GDP 
continues to shrink, from 13.08% in 2000 to 12.90% in 2003. 21  In fact, the 
government’s allotted budget became so tight that it soon was forced to access other 
funds. In the 1980’s the household share of national income rose between 10 to 15 
percent and the ratio of savings to national income rose from 4% in 1978 to 15% in 
                                                        
20 Xiaonong Cheng. “Breaking the Social Contract.” 118. 
21 Country Briefings: China. The Economist. 13 May 2004. 
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1990. 22  Because central authority controls bank systems, the government took 
advantage of increased public savings and began drawing from bank savings to pay 
for its welfare program and finance the dying state sector. 
 Even as the budget dwindled and even as state sector profits fell from 15% to 2% 
between 1985 and 1993, the state continued to draw funds it did not have to finance 
SOEs’ inefficiency.23 However, even this money was not sufficient and enterprises 
began to turn to loans to pay for welfare benefits and buy political compliance. 
Xiaonong Cheng states that many of the managers taking out these loans had no plan 
to repay them. It would appear that the maintenance of the social contract and the 
happiness of workers were more important than profits or economic viability. Because, 
again, all money must go accounted, the banks would bear the consequences of 
welfare spending. 
 The money drawn out by the central government compounded by the outstanding 
state sector loans had the overall effect of increasing the risk of bankruptcy among 
China’s financial institutions. This occurred because the total net assets of the banking 
system shrank with each RMB funneled into the SOEs and the welfare system. Soon, 
the banks found themselves without financial resources and the loans they continued 
to issue were not backed by actual money. In 1994, 60% of China’s bank loans were 
‘dead loans’.24 According to international standards the Chinese banking system was 
technically bankrupt by 1997. Only the prop of central authority kept it from going 
under. To pay for social welfare and uphold the social contract, the Party / State had 
                                                        
22 Xiaonong Cheng. “Breaking the Social Contract.” 118. 
23 Ibid, 118. 
24 Ibid, 119. 
 16
depleted all its financial resources. If stress were to be removed from the social 
contract and the banks saved, outside capital would have to enter the economy in an 
amount greater than resources leaving. Essentially, China needed donations. 
 
NGOs and Economic Turnaround 
 As the Chinese system struggled to fund social welfare in the early 1990’s, 
foreign NGOs began emerging to address concerns ranging from health and disease 
prevention to environmental protection.25 Although there is no direct causation, the 
correlation between government constraints and NGO development is significant. If 
the Party had been unable to continue funding the social contract, the political 
stability of China could have been jeopardized. NGO external funding and welfare 
delivery improvement helped to ward off the impending financial crisis of the 1990’s 
and in turn pull the Party back from the brink of looming political turmoil. For these 
reasons, the government has, in general, warmly welcomed the presence NGOs, and 
the two parties’ interaction has been cooperative. Zhang Liwei of the Lijiang city 
Foreign Affairs Office seconded those sentiments by saying that the government, both 
local and national, has had strong, productive relationships with foreign NGOs.26  
 It has increasingly evident that the 190 plus NGOs in China and the CCP have 
become allies in social welfare delivery. With an estimated combine annual spending 
of 100 million USD, the impact of foreign NGOs on the economy of welfare in China 
                                                        
25 NGOs Come of Age. BJReview.com. 14 May 2005. < http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200413/viewpoint.htm>
26 Zhang Liwei. Interview with Zhang Liwei. Lijiang city Foreign Affairs Office. 19 April 2005. 
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has been significant.27 Though overall economic growth has continued in China 
without need of external support, credit for the recent progress in stability and 
efficiency is due in part to the financial assistance of foreign NGOs. As cited by the 
Economist, GDP growth reached a real rate of 9.10% in 2003 compared to 8.00% in 
2000.28 The banking system, virtually bankrupt in 1997, has taken steps to analyze 
risky investment areas and, as such, has reduced losses on new loans. The percentage 
of non-performing or ‘dead’ loans has also been reduced to 13.2% in 2004 from 18% 
in 2003.29 Their ability to do this lies in part with the willingness of NGOs to invest 
resources in areas deemed risky for bank lending. Even in the SOE sector, which still 
occupied 41% of China’s industrial output in 2002, steps have been taken to minimize 
loss and maximize efficiency. One state owned coal-fired power plant has generated 
more than a million dollars in savings by monitoring coal quality from suppliers.30
 For the time being, the Party / state has successfully tackled the pressing issues of 
the late 1990’s financial woes. The social contract, and the government’s access to 
legitimacy, remains intact. Providing one hundred million US dollars a year, the 
financial contributions of NGOs have made great strides in developing welfare 
delivery systems and have, inadvertently, helped fund the CCP’s purchase of political 
stability. Though the Party / state still has great obstacles to overcome, including 
unemployment, the rural / urban income gap, and the growing disparity between rich 
                                                        
27 About the Dingo. China Development Brief. October 1999. 
<http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/page.asp?sec=4&sub=4&pg=0> 
28 Country Briefings: China. The Economist. 13 May 2004. 
29 Consumer Lending in China. The Economist. 21 April 2005. 
<http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=S%27%29%28L%25QQ%5B%26%200%215%0A> 
30 Spurring performance in China’s State-Owned Enterprises. McKinsey Quarterly. 2004. < 
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page.aspx?ar=1492&L2=19&L3=69&srid=7&gp=1> 
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and poor, the future appears brighter than it once was. At present, through the 
combined resources of state-sponsored programs and foreign NGO activity, the social 
contract is fulfilled and in a stable and fiscally sound manner. 
Case Studies 
 The following three case studies give insight into the manner in which NGOs 
directly influence social welfare. Though they by no means represent a summary of 
all NGO activity in China, they do provide a look into the mechanisms of NGOs in 
Yunnan province.  
Role of NGOs in Welfare Development 
 In securing their independent ambitions, foreign NGOs directly or indirectly play 
a dramatic role in developing social welfare systems at local levels. The following 
case studies will refer to the following five aspects of NGO welfare development. 
1. Providing access to foreign capital 
2. Improving the justice of welfare distribution 
3. Improving the efficiency of economy or life in an area 
4. Developing sustainable living and economic growth 
5. Promoting healthy living, which in turn lowers the welfare burden 
of medical expenses. 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
 The Nature Conservancy was officially registered in the United States in 1951. 
They began international work in the 1980’s and came to China in 1997 at the request 
of the Chinese government. Their mission as declared in the TNC mission statement 
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is “To preserve the plants, animals, and natural communities that represent diversity 
of life on earth by protecting the lands and waters they need to survive.” Supported by 
56 staff members, TNC has 4 field offices in Yunnan (Nujiang, Lijiang, Shangri-la, 
and Deqin) plus administration in Beijing. Their work centers on ‘conservation area 
planning’ in which threats to natural resources are discovered and strategies are 
developed to combat destructive practices. Their current work can best be categorized 
by the following: 
1. Alternate Energy Planning 
- Reducing the consumption of wood in energy production 
2. Environmental Education 
- Increasing awareness of natural resources and conservation 
4. Integrated Resource Planning and Area Management 
- Helping to build the capacity of nature reserve management 
3. Photo Voice 
- Helping local people’s express themselves through photos of 
their communities.31 
 
Lijiang Field Project 
 As stated above, one of the most influential roles played by NGOs in China is 
improving the access to external capital. In partnership with the United Nations, the 
Nature Conservancy in Lijiang has started a program of consumer credit lending in 
                                                        
31 Xia Zuzhang. Interview with Xia Zuzhang. Alternative Energy Program Director TNC. 20 April 2005. 
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hopes of developing rural economy. The program, started in January 2005, provides 
participating families with a 5000 RMB loan to pursue economic initiatives. Mu 
Jinhua, a TNC project manager at the Lijiang field office, reported that much of the 
money goes into purchasing livestock, specifically pigs32. The loan is expected to be 
repaid to TNC with interest paid into a village association registered with the civil 
affairs office. Though the money is not a donation, it is still access to capital that 
would otherwise remain unavailable. Because income in rural areas is low, banks 
often feel loans to rural areas are at a higher risk of remaining unpaid. As such, few 
rural families can secure the capital to start up livestock raising or a small business. 
TNC has thus far provided 30,000 RMB dispersed among 6 families since the 
program’s inception in January. 
 The money provided by The Nature Conservancy does a great deal to promote 
justice in the distribution of welfare resources in Yunnan. Currently, 13 of the 15 
counties in which TNC is operating are below the poverty level.33 As stated above, 
the ability of these people to pull themselves up is heavily dependent on the 
government’s willingness to provide economic opportunity. Limited government 
finances and the risks of rural lending have left these communities with little external 
assistance. The Nature Conservancy hopes to equalize the imbalance in welfare 
opportunity between rural and urban areas through their consumer credit program. 
 Along with the credit program, the Lijiang field office is doing a great deal to 
promote the use of alternative energy. Wood burning poses a great threat to the forests 
                                                        
32 Mu Jinhua. Interview with Mu Jinhua. Alternative Energy Program Coordinator TNC. 20 April 2005. 
33 Xia Zuzhang. Interview. 
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of Northwest Yunnan province and much of TNC work in alternative energy is to 
protect natural resources. However, improving energy production has a great impact 
on the efficiency of life in the affected communities. Collecting wood in the amounts 
needed for heating and cooking, especially in higher altitude areas, takes time. It is 
estimated that in the TNC project areas 75% of households use wood as the primary 
fuel. In lowland areas, between 2 - 6 tons of wood is used per household per year. In 
higher altitude areas where there is a greater demand for heating, households can use 
up to 20 or 30 tons of wood per year.34 The time needed to collect wood has a high 
opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is the cost of not doing something because one is 
doing something else. For instance, while villagers are collecting wood they are not 
working the fields or tending livestock. In general, collecting wood for fuel takes time 
away from activities that could contribute economic benefits to the community. 
Alternative energy solutions improve an area’s efficiency just by lowering the amount 
of time needed to collect wood fuel. 
 Efficiency is also improved by the various means of energy production. TNC has 
introduced biogas energy production into a few communities in Lijiang province. 
Biogas energy units use human and animal waste to produce a relatively clean 
burning gas used mainly for cooking. Through a fermentation process, waste products 
are used constructively to provide fuel with little maintenance. Families need only to 
collect waste in the unit. The process continues without any other necessary inputs. 
Besides the flammable gas, product from the units can also be sprayed on fruits to 
                                                        
34 Ibid. 
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prevent pests with no harm to humans. Time is saved in energy production and fruit 
can be produced with less loss due to pests. 
 Solar water heaters are also being introduced in TNC areas. Sitting on the roof, 
the solar water heater uses energy from the sun to heat water with no external inputs 
and very little maintenance. Previously, villagers prepared pig feed with water heated 
by wood fuel. Now hot water is readily available and does not require the burning of 
inefficient wood. In the Haixi Village, a TNC work site, one half of the 176 
households contain either biogas or solar energy units (50 units and 38 units 
respectively).35 Mu Jinhua reports that the villages participating in the alternate 
energy project are happy with the improvements and the benefits provided by efficient 
energy production. 
 Both consumer credit programs and the alternate energy project are aimed at 
providing options for sustainable growth. In fact, Xia Zuzhang mentioned that 
conservation, the overall goal of TNC work, and sustainability are one in the same. To 
conserve natural resources a sustainable balance must be made between man and 
nature. In terms of social welfare, sustainability equals stability and a foundation upon 
which progress can be made. As stated above, the Chinese governments struggle to 
provide for benefits in the social contract has been an unsustainable process. 
Resources were used faster than they could be replenished. In the countryside, 
however, the Nature Conservancy has created patches of sustainable living, key to any 
successful welfare system. 
                                                        
35 Wang Jianjiao. Interview with Wang Jianjiao. Lijiang Provincial Foreign Affairs Office. 20 April 2005. 
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 TNC projects have also promoted healthy living in work areas. Wood fuel has a 
reputation for creating indoor air pollution problems, especially under intensive use. 
By reducing the use of wood consumption, alternate energy equally reduces problems 
related to indoor air pollution. Biogas units also handle problems with waste 
management in areas with little sanitation infrastructure. Because waste goes into 
biogas units it stays out of water supplies improving the quality of water for villagers 
and those living downstream. The improvement of health in an area has a direct 
impact on social welfare delivery. Improving health reduces the amount of already 
limited resources that must be diverted into medical improvement. In areas like Haixi 
Village, healthy living keeps villagers productive and frees resources for 
development. 
 As can be expected, The Nature Conservancy has had no conflicts with the 
government. Xia Zuzhang attributes this to the TNC approach. He explained, “The 
Nature conservancy is not about forcing ideas on people. TNC simply recognizes a 
problem and proposes a solution. It is offering assistance not insisting upon it.” The 
Nature Conservancy also keeps a mutual, cooperative relationship with the 
government. It is the NGOs’ policy that projects are owned by the government. TNC 
is simply a tool for assistance.  
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Oxfam Hong Kong 
 Registered in the 1980’s Oxfam Hong Kong is one of 10 members of the 
umbrella organization, Oxfam International. Oxfam Hong Kong describes their work 
with the following, “We work with people regardless of race, sex, religion, or politics 
in their struggle against poverty, distress, and suffering. Our vision is for a world 
where people are equally assured of their rights with respect, including access to food, 
shelter, employment and health care, in a sustainable manner.” The organization 
entered China with plans to start long-term poverty reduction programs in the North 
and Southwest. In 1992, Oxfam H.K. established itself in Kunming. Currently Oxfam 
H.K. has offices in Kunming, Guizhou, and Beijing with about 40 staff in total. The 
six guiding aims of their program are sustainable livelihood, basic services, life 
security, participation in society, equity and diversity, and global citizenship. All of 
their programs are at least 6 years in duration plus a 2-year start up period.36
 The majority of Oxfam Hong Kong’s contributions are monetary in nature. Over 
a year’s period each of the three China offices have an independent budget of around 
10 million RMB. The money spent in China, representing 52% of the organization’s 
total yearly expenditure, is largely funded by donations from Hong Kong citizens and 
private business. Poverty reduction, according to Oxfam Hong Kong is directly linked 
to capital access so a major portion of their work in communities involves creating a 
working financial system. Under the management of village organizations and the 
monitoring eye of Oxfam, donated money is loaned out among the community for 
                                                        
36 Dimin Wang. Interview with Dimin Wang. Senior Administrative Officer Oxfam Hong Kong. 13 May 2005. 
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small enterprising or infrastructure development. Loans are to be repaid, however 
unlike the TNC credit lending program all Oxfam money stays in the community. 
Repayment, including minimal interest, goes back to the village organization. 
Because the money stays in the village, communities can collectively pursue large 
infrastructure programs or re-circulate finances for loans in the future. In Oxfam work 
areas, welfare systems are improved exponentially simply from access to newly 
created capital markets. 
 As stated above, access to credit in rural areas is difficult because low-income 
rural families are often seen as having a greater potential to default on loan payments. 
Oxfam, however, has a policy of donating to the poorest areas in China regardless of 
their ability to repay. One reason the program has been so well received is its      
willingness to establish lending systems in communities the government cannot or 
will not aide. The group also pays special attention to the women in the affected 
communities. As Dimin Wang, Senior Administrative Officer at the Kunming office, 
stated, women in China have traditionally been unable to express feelings or opinions 
in regard to community development. Oxfam ensures that in work communities, 
women’s voices are heard and they are involved in decision-making. Both lending to 
disenfranchised areas and developing the role of women in local communities has 
improved the justice of welfare in rural areas. 
 The development of rural areas through large sum donation is most evident in 
large-scale infrastructure development. Much of the Oxfam money initially goes to 
developing roads, schools or health care institutions. The effect of even limited 
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infrastructure on a village’s economy is significant. Construction of roads in an area 
both increases the efficiency of internal transportation and opens up markets outside 
the village for trade. Roadwork can even increase the ease of importing externally 
produced goods into the local economy, which often can reduce price inflation from 
transportation costs. The construction of schools also does a great deal to improve the 
functioning of an economy. New generations of educated children are growing up in 
Oxfam villages with access to skill training and start-up capital. Entirely agricultural 
villages are now diversifying their economic value by starting enterprises in 
woodcutting, weaving or other handicrafts. 
 As previously stated, it is one of the Oxfam aim’s to promote sustainable 
livelihood. This is achieved primarily because donated money stays within the 
community.  If properly managed and well regulated the Oxfam initial donation will 
last for years upon years in the community. With successful investment in productive 
enterprises the money may even accumulate profits and interest. As the popular 
saying goes, “it takes money to earn money.” Oxfam gives poverty stricken areas the 
initial capital to develop successful and sustainable economic growth. 
 In regard to healthy living, Oxfam donation has gone to the development of 
medical facilities in villages previously without proper health care systems. Aside 
from the obvious delivery of medical care, these facilities have also been engaged in 
health education in the surrounding area. Oxfam money supports education that 
allows villagers to make healthier choices and take care of minor ailments effectively 
and without the need for expensive medical treatment. Aside from the direct 
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development of health maintenance, Oxfam money has significantly reduced poverty 
in work areas. By simply improving the standard of living, Oxfam has given villagers 
the means to create their own healthy lifestyle. Education, medical care and poverty 
reduction have together improved the overall health of Oxfam villages and have 
alleviated many welfare concerns. 
 Oxfam Hong Kong’s interaction with the government has been equally successful. 
All projects are carried out under mutually signed contracts, and the local government 
is involved in every step of the Oxfam project. In many rural areas, especially in those 
heavily burdened by poverty, local authorities are under constant pressure to improve 
the welfare of local people. However, in most cases the government does not have the 
resources or knowledge to do so. Oxfam’s donations of resources and functional 
knowledge have aided local governments and given them the means to provide proper 
social welfare. 
 
Health and Development Aid Abroad (HADAA) 
 The Health and Development Aid Abroad organization is a small Australian based 
NGO dedicated to improving the lives of those plagued by poor health and economic 
misfortune. HADAA, established first in Kunming in 2000, is smaller than the 
previous two NGOs with only 10 staff members and a 200,000 RMB per year 
operating budget. The organization is devoted to improving access to capital through 
loans, English language education, and health and sanitation systems.37
                                                        
37 Dennis, Colin. Interview with Colin Dennis. Chief Representative in Yunnan, Health and Development Aid 
Abroad. 18 May 2005. 
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 Like The Nature Conservancy and Oxfam Hong Kong, HADAA has started a 
micro-enterprise lending program to support the development of local economies. The 
HADAA fund, supported by private donations and grants, lends 2,000 RMB on 
average to families for the development of small enterprises. Like TNC lending, most 
HADAA loans go to the development of pig farming, though Colin Dennis, Chief 
Representative for HADAA in Yunnan, told of one loan going to the construction of a 
family restaurant. All HADAA loans are expected to be repaid but there is no interest 
or administration fee charged. Like the other lending programs, HADAA loans target 
those who otherwise are without access to government-sponsored loans for 
development. HADAA provides foreign capital where domestic lending chooses not 
to go. 
 One program unique to HADAA is child sponsorship. In events of war, poverty 
or distress, it is usually children who suffer the most. Without full and equal treatment, 
children are at the mercy of surrounding adults and often survive on the resources of 
others. In poverty situations, children are least likely to have the capacity to support 
themselves and often domestic welfare programs do little to help. For these reasons, 
HADAA has developed a child sponsorship program. Individual children are 
sponsored from the HADAA budget and are provided basic necessities to ensure a 
healthy livelihood. Unlike other sponsorship programs, there are no contributing 
families overseas with a direct, one-to-one relationship with a sponsored child. 
However, HADAA employees have developed relationships with the children under 
the organizations care. The Health and Development Aid Abroad group is currently 
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providing just support to over 500 children in Yunnan. 
 Like TNC and Oxfam, HADAA wishes to promote justice by bringing their 
resources to the poorest and most needy areas of China. However, Dennis noted that 
this is often not possible. At times, the government will request that lending or 
financial assistance be withheld from the poorest groups. Fearing they will be unable 
to properly make use of donations, the government has, at times, asked HADAA to 
give resources only to those in need who had the capacity to make use of them. 
 HADAA has been successful despite their comparatively small budget partially 
because of the belief that education, not necessarily money, provides the best resource 
to development. Thus, part of their work in China includes the development of rural 
education systems. In Northeast Yunnan, HADAA has two staff members promoting 
an organized English education program in country schools. One teacher is working 
directly with students on English education. The other is developing an English 
curriculum and teaching teachers proper English instruction. It is believed that 
education is the best means to a good occupation, and good work is the best means to 
a successful livelihood. It is the goal of HADAA to improve development, and as such 
economic efficiency, through rural education programs. 
 In the areas where HADAA and other NGOs are working, poverty is a pervasive 
and consistent part of life. It is the goal of poverty reduction organizations to combat 
poverty, not just temporarily, but indefinitely. Therefore, all programs, including 
HADAA’s, are aimed at sustainable poverty reduction and economic development. 
The micro-enterprise lending program is aimed at creating enterprises that will bring a 
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consistent income to villages or communities. The education program hopes to give 
rural people the means to effectively and efficiently combat poverty in their 
community. Both are elements of sustainable development in an area. 
 Aside from lending and education reform, HADAA has started planning 
programs to reduce the prevalence of AIDS in the Laos border region. According to 
Avert.org, an international AIDS charity, the prevalence of AIDS in Yunnan ranks it as 
one of the most affected areas in China.38 The border regions are especially precarious 
as much of the disease’s spread is attributed to drug use in the area. Although still 
primitive, the HADAA program hopes to reduce the spread of AIDS through 
education and support. The Health and Development Aid Abroad organization is also 
pursuing small infrastructure development in Xishuanbanna, especially development 
of sanitation systems. Dennis noted one project in which HADAA developed public 
toilets in a village that previously had no such sanitation system. The AIDS project 
and the development of sanitation infrastructure are means to promote healthier living 
in the NGOs work areas. 
 Unlike TNC and Oxfam Hong Kong, Colin Dennis did mention that HADAA has 
had minor difficulties with the government in the past. Although their relationship is 
at present healthy, the government has chided HADAA for its small operating budget. 
Dennis continued, explaining that there is an unstated minimum amount of money the 
government expects from NGOs. He elaborated, mentioning that even the Chinese 
term for NGO, Fei (1) Zheng (4) fu (3) Zu (3) Zhi (1), has an implied financial 
                                                        
38 Avert.org. Annabel Kanabus. Avert. 22 December 2004. < http://www.avert.org/aidschina.htm> 
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component. It would seem that the government not only appreciates foreign donation 
through NGOs, it expects it. That being said, HADAA has received cooperation from 
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Appendix B: Itinerary 
 The 19th and 20th of April were spent in Lijiang with members of the local foreign 
affairs office and the staff of The Nature Conservancy Lijiang field office. For the 
remainder of the research period (April 25- May 24, 2005), interviews and field study 
were conducted in the city of Kunming China. Any transportation expenses were 
minor and can be attributed to taxi and bus fare within Kunming. 
Appendix C: Post-Project Evaluation 
 Conducting ISP research was initially very frustrating. Scheduling appointments 
over the phone and trying to navigate around Kunming to reach interview sites was 
rather difficult, especially in light of my inability to speak Chinese. Within the first 
week, I scheduled and subsequently failed to get to, two different interviews because I 
could not find their location. As the local NGOs shut down for the holiday during the 
second week of my research, I was feeling frustrated and slightly overwhelmed. 
However, once people returned from holiday, I was able to schedule interviews and 
had a productive 3rd week. With help from Lu Yuan, I was able to meet with Duan 
Guang from the Institute of Economy, which provided an internal opinion on the 
development of welfare and the economy. 
 Overall, this has been a vastly rewarding process. I’ve had the opportunity to 
meet with successful and devoted individuals, working hard to better the circumstance 
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of the Chinese people. All informants were kind, patient and willing to tell all they 
could about their activities in Yunnan. I feel that this project has been successful even 
beyond my first expectations. 
Appendix D: Future Possible Topics
- A closer look at foreign NGOs’ impact on specific communities and 
economies 
- NGOs use of government advocacy programs 
- Methods of delivering social welfare 
- Emerging private insurance 
- Old age pension systems or the social security of the elderly 
- Unemployment and the government’s response 
- NGOs and the conservation movement in Yunnan 





Since the death of Mao and the rise of reformers in China, the world has eagerly 
awaited the results of market liberalization. Switching from command and control to 
market driven economics, however, effects more than banks and businesses. The 
entire economic, political, and social landscape of China is being reborn in light of 
reform. Xiaonong Cheng, in his article “Breaking the Social Contract,” refers to one 
such collateral change. He points out that reform has switched the power structure in 
China from “command and obedience” to “feeding and cooperation;” more 
specifically the Party / State can no longer hide on top of a mountain of ideology and 
force, but is now compelled to concede benefits in turn for legitimacy and support. It 
must engage in a social contract. As such the Party / State’s power is dependent on its 
ability to secure welfare benefits to the 1 billion plus people of China; a much more 
daunting task under market liberalization than under socialism. 
 
Concurrent with market liberalization, foreign NGOs and aid organizations have 
blossomed in China’s once inhospitable soil. A nation which was born in the fight 
against imperialism is now welcoming foreign ideas on aid, economics, and social 
welfare. It is the goal of this project to analyze the relationship between foreign 
NGOs’ supplement to social welfare and the legitimacy of the Party / state in the 
social contract. Previous work on the subject has made references to such a 
connection; such as Jude Howell’s “Prospects for NGOs in China.” “The reformers 
are envisaging a greater role for social organizations in the delivery of social welfare 
services.” However, this project hopes to make contributions to this dialogue by 
studying the nature of the NGO-Party / state relationship in Yunnan, and the potential 
benefits to Party / state legitimacy through the social benefits provided by NGOs. 
 
II. Resources 
Dilemnas of Reform in Jiang Zemin’s China edited by Andrew J. Nathan 1999 
“Breaking the Social Contract” by Xiaonong Cheng 
China’s Social Security System edited by Gao Shangquan and Chi Fulin 1996 
Reforming China’s Financial System edited by Gao Shangquan and Chi Fulin 1996 
“Prospects for NGOs in China” by Jude Howell 1995 
 
Interview with the following at their convenience 
Ghias, Yunnan Project Manager, Save the Children UK 
Zhuang Hao, CFO Nature Conservancy in Yunnan 




- What are the benefits provided by NGOs that cannot be reproduced by the Chinese 
Government  
- What are the methods used by NGOs to provide social welfare? 
- How does the government feel about foreign NGOs operating in China? 
- Are the contributions to social welfare recognized by the Party / state 
- In what way does the government limit the action of NGOs 
-Are these limitations consistent with the belief that NGOs are only to provide 
benefits to welfare? 
 
Procedures 
Interviews, guided conversations, research of previous materials 
 
IV. Itinerary 
Sites and Dates 
Research conducted in Kunming for the duration of the ISP period. 
 
V. Budget 
600 Yuan – lodging 
200 Yuan – transportation 
400 Yuan – food 




I imagine that my inability to speak Chinese will be very limiting. I anticipate that I 
can find staff within foreign NGOs that can speak English, but I still feel I will run 
into difficulties with communication. 
Strategies 
I hope to enlist the help of fellow SIT students when I need translation help. I also 
imagine I will have to be patient and accept setbacks gracefully. 
 
